The squadron was re-formed 16 May 1939 on board the aircraft
carrier HMS Argus for service in Egypt. It was based initially at RAF Helwan.
On 26 May, "B" Flight was detached and sent to Sudan. The squadron
did not receive its aircraft, obsolescent Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters,
until June. After Italyentered the war,
on 10 June 1940, the squadron was almost immediately in action, defending Egypt
from Italian bombers. "B" Flight became part of No. 14 Squadron RAF
on 30 June.
In January 1941, the squadron joined Allied forces defending
Greece, providing air cover and offensive support over Albania. It later took
part in fierce dogfights as part of the air defence of the Athens area. With
the collapse of the Allied campaign on the Greek mainland, 112 Sqn withdrew to
Crete and then to Egypt, from where it rejoined the North African Campaign,
supporting the Eighth Army.
For much of the remainder of the war, the squadron was part
of No. 239 Wing, along with No. 3 Squadron RAAF, No. 250 Squadron RAF and/or
No. 450 Squadron RAAF. For the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) on
July 10, 1943, No. 239 Wing consisted of these four squadrons and No.260
Squadron as part of Air Vice Marshal Harry Broadhurst's Desert Air Force, an
element of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham's Northwest African Tactical Air
Force in the Northwest African Air Forces of Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, one of the
major sub-commands of the Mediterranean Air Command under Air
Commander-in-Chief Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder.
During July 1941, the squadron was one of the first in the
world to become operational with the P-40 Tomahawk, which it used in both the
fighter and ground attack role, with the Air Headquarters, Western Desert.
Inspired by the unusually large air inlet on the P-40, the squadron began to
emulate the "shark mouth" logo used on some German Messerschmitt Bf
110s of Zerstörer Geschwader 76 earlier in the war. This practice was later
followed by P-40 units in other parts of the world (including the Flying
Tigers, American volunteers serving with the Chinese Air Force). In December,
the Tomahawks were replaced by the updated P-40 Kittyhawk, which the squadron
used for the remainder of its time in North Africa, often as a fighter bomber.
The squadron during this time included a significant number
of personnel from the air forces of Poland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
Another member was the English ace Neville Duke (later prominent as a test
pilot). For most of 1942, it was commanded by the highest-scoring Australian
ace of World War II, Clive Caldwell, the first Empire Air Training Scheme
graduate to command a British unit. He was succeeded by Billy Drake, the
highest-scoring RAF P-40 pilot and the second-highest-scoring British
Commonwealth P-40 pilot, behind Caldwell.
Later in the war, an increasing number of South African
pilots joined the unit.
After the invasion of Sicily the squadron moved to bases
there, in July 1943, and onto the Italian mainland in September. In June 1944
the Kittyhawks were replaced by the Mustang Mark III and, from February 1945,
Mustang Mk IVs. The squadron remained in Italy as part of the occupying forces until
disbanding on 30 December 1946 at Treviso.
By the end of the war some 206 air victories had been
claimed by the Squadron, and 62 destroyed on the ground.
Alfred Gause (right), Chief of Staff to Erwin Rommel, speaks with the commander, Italian General Enea Navarini (left) and Colonel Paul Diesener (behind Rommel).
For the first time in his life, Rommel is on the retreat - a
mortifying experience. ‘How humble one learns to be,’ he says in a letter to
Lucie. His first halt is at the Gazala line, but the slow and panicky Italians,
largely unmotorized, are an encumbrance. He does not have the gasoline or
ammunition to fight back, and his best men are failing him. Neumann-Silkow lies
in a soldier’s grave. Summermann of the Ninetieth Light Division has also been
killed, by an RAF attack. Some of his surviving commanders are succumbing to
desert plagues. Even Cruwell is sick, infected by jaundice. And what will
become of the 14,000 troops he has left in strongpoints along the Sollum front
and in the Bardia fortress, now that the Panzer Group is moving ever farther away
from them toward the west? ‘Don’t worry,’ he writes to Lucie, I’m feeling okay
and hope my lucky star won’t leave me.’
And yet Rommel has by no means shot his bolt. During
December 1941 he proves that he is a master of the obstinate retreat. Probably
only combat soldiers can appreciate the size of Rommel’s achievement in having
retreated across nearly 300 miles in one month without serious loss to his
force, while still inflicting savage wounds on his tormentors. Yet although he
had salvaged the largely nonmotorized Italian troops, Bastico and his comrades
did not render appreciation. ‘Understandably,’ mocked Rommel in a letter, ‘these
would-be warlords have pulled wry faces. It’s easy to criticize.’
Praise for Rommel reached him from an unusual quarter. The
Afrika Korps diary for December 17 had stated: ‘According to subsequent
dispatches of the U.S. ambassador in Cairo, we had driven straight through the
British Twenty-second Armored Brigade. He describes it as a masterpiece.’
How did Rommel know what the American ambassador to Egypt
was putting in his dispatches? In September, Italian agents had burglarized the
U.S. Embassy in Rome and photographed its copy of the ‘Black Code.’ For many
months thereafter, Italian and German code breakers could eavesdrop on top
secret American communications. Of sensational value were the reports sent to
the War Department in Washington by the military attache in Cairo, Colonel
Bonner Fellers, because he was a perceptive battlefield observer and kept
himself abreast of all the English army’s plans against Rommel and its expectations
of the Panzer Group’s next moves. This was a tremendous advantage to Rommel and
helps explain his coming triumph.
Rommel - normally not overly security conscious - kept these
‘little fellers,’ as he engagingly termed the American dispatches, close to his
chest. There is no mention of them in his diaries (or even his memoirs). Hitler
knew about them, however. ‘Let’s hope that the U.S. legation in Cairo keeps us
well posted about Britain’s military planning, thanks to their poorly encoded
telegrams,’ he wisecracked to Hermann Goring over lunch one day in June 1942.
One of Rommel’s intelligence staff recalls now: ‘Rommel used to wait for the
dispatches each evening. We just knew them as the ‘Good Source.’ When Fellers
reported to Washington, ‘The British are preparing to retreat, they are burning
secret papers,’ then Rommel would really see red - there was no holding him.’
As yet Rommel’s preoccupation in January 1942 was survival.
But he was growing ever more sanguine. He knew that time was now in his favor.
Under Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, a new air force had arrived in the
Mediterranean, and squadrons based in Sicily were neutralizing Malta by air
raids. U-boats were harassing the British fleet. Rommel wrote approvingly on
January 4, ‘Kesselring’s coming to see me again today. We’re both now working
hand in glove.’ And the next day: ‘We’re gradually getting more materiel over
here. He’s really knocking the stuffing out of Malta.’ That was the day,
January 5, 1942, that nine merchant ships - escorted by no less than four
Italian battleships - safely docked at Tripoli and unloaded over fifty tanks
for Rommel, and 2000 tons of aviation fuel. This was Hitler’s New Year’s gift
to his favorite commander. ‘If today’s convoy succeeds in getting through,’
Hitler told General Gause - his guest for lunch in his bunker headquarters – ‘then
the British are going to have to look out!’ A few minutes later Gause
commented, ‘It was a relief for us to learn of Japan’s entry into the war.’
Hitler was at that time unperturbed by the fact that he was also at war with
the United States, and commented to Gause: ‘Yes, a relief. But also a turning
point in history. It means the loss of a whole continent, India. And that we
must regret, because it is the white race that is the loser.’
For several days Rommel toured his units, digging in along
the line at Mersa Brega…
A Matilda tank of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment in the Western Desert.
Fighting began with a desultory and ill-prepared Italian
advance into Egypt from Tripoli that ended in disaster for Italy. The British
struck back in Operation COMPASS starting on December 8, 1940. The British
counteroffensive saw a breakthrough assault by the Western Desert Force at Sidi
Barrani, 60 miles inside the Egyptian border. In the first week of January
1941, Major General Richard O’Connor sent freshly arrived Australians into
their first offensive action in the desert at Bardia . More sharp fighting and
additional Italian defeats followed at Tobruk and Beda Fomm in February.
O’Connor hoped to press the attack to Benghazi, but was held back by shortages
of supplies and men as he reached the end of a stretched logistical
tether—pulled even thinner because Britain simultaneously mounted another
assault on the Italian empire in East Africa. The Western Desert Force thus
halted at El Agheila. It had lost just over 1,700 total casualties while inflicting
over 130,000 Italian casualties, killed or wounded or taken prisoner. The
cumulative effect of COMPASS was destruction of Italian 10th Army and large
stocks of Regio Esercito war matériel. The Western Desert Force also advanced
nearly 500 miles, the first of several lateral movements across the top of
Africa that would become a singular mark of the desert campaign. At the time,
it remained to be learned by both sides that desert advances might be just as
quickly turned into comparable or even worse reverses.
By January 1941, with Operation Compass exceeding all
expectations, Churchill began to press the case for Greece once again. British
intelligence had discerned that a Wehrmacht invasion was in the offing, though
its precise timing was a matter of conjecture.Armed with this information, the Prime Minister sent a note to General
‘Pug’ Ismay, his trusted assistant and go-between with the Chiefs of
Staff.'It is quite clear to me that
supporting Greece must have priority after the Western flank of Egypt has been
made secure,’ he wrote. Three days later, Wavell - who was at this point
overseeing O’Connor’s advance towards Tobruk and Benghazi - was told in
unequivocal terms that Greece was hence- forth to take precedence over all
other operations in his command.
The general did not attempt to conceal his dismay. In a
cable to London, he argued that the German concentration in Romania was merely
‘a move in the war of nerves' designed both to prop up the Italians and to
induce the Chiefs of Staff to arrest the advance in Libya and 'disperse our forces
in the Middle East ...We trust the COS
will reconsider whether the enemy's move is not bluff'.
In Whitehall, the Director of Military Operations, Major
General John Kennedy, strongly sympathised with Wavell’s reluctance to divert
forces from the desert to Greece.He
made an appointment to see Dill, the CIGS and his immediate superior. Insisting
that his team judged that ‘at least twenty divisions, plus a considerable
airforce' would be needed simply to hold Salonika, let alone to confront a
full-scale Wehrmacht invasion, he argued tartly that the Germans' could overrun
Greece with the utmost ease if they wanted to do so', and concluded that ‘we
stood more to gain by winning the African coast for ourselves than by denying
Greece to the Germans.' Kennedy did not prevail. The Chiefs of Staff sided with
Churchill, whose response to Wavell was brusquely dismissive.
'Our information contradicts the idea that German
concentration in Roumania is merely a "move in the war of nerves" or
"a bluff to cause dispersion of forces",' he told Wavell in a cable
on 10 January.On the contrary, there was
‘a mass of detail' confirming that the build-up was the prelude to an early
and’ deadly' onslaught against Greece which would 'eclipse victories you have gained
in Libya'.
Instructing his Middle East commander-in-chief to 'conform your
plans to larger interest at stake', he peremptorily closed off further discussion
with the words, ‘We expect and require prompt and active compliance with our
decisions, for which we bear full responsibility.' As a loyal soldier, Wavell
had little choice but to obey or resign.
Desert Rats
The nickname Desert Rats was applied to at least three
British army organizations that were instrumental in the North African
Campaigns against the Italians and Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. The name
derives from the jerboa, a nocturnal rodent native to North Africa, which hops
like a kangaroo.
The 4th Armoured Brigade, which was formed in Egypt in 1938,
before the outbreak of war but after the Munich Conference and Agreement, has
traditionally claimed to be the first British unit to have adopted the
sobriquet Desert Rats. However, the 7th Armoured Division appropriated the name
and preceded the 4th Armoured Brigade back to England in preparation for the
Normandy landings (D-day). The 4th Armoured Brigade left North Africa and
participated in the fighting in Italy before returning to England prior to the
D-day invasion. When the 4th reached England, it discovered that the 7th was
not only calling itself the Desert Rats, but had created a divisional badge
featuring an image of a jerboa. Thus spurred, the 4th Armoured Brigade created
its own jerboa badge. Finally, the nickname the Desert Rats was also often
applied generally to the entire Eighth British Army to honor its combat success
against the Axis forces in North Africa.
The Italian Supreme Command moved quickly
to organize the "Special Armoured Brigade" (Brigata Corazzato
Speciale, or BCS) consisting of fifty-five M13/40 tanks, artillery pieces, and
supported by infantry formations specializing in the anti-tank role and sappers
equipped with anti-tank mines. In hardly more than a month, the Italians
dispatched this volunteer force under General Valentino Babini to North Africa.
The M13s in the BCS were a vast improvement to the M11s. They had a better
turret-mounted 47 mm tank gun which was more than able to pierce the armour of
the British light and cruiser tanks. However, other than command vehicles,
Italian tanks were not equipped with radios. Communicating for most Italian
tankers required the use of signal flags.
Bambini's tank force included the 3rd
Battalion and the 5th Battalion from the 131st "Centauro" Armoured
Division and should have amounted to at least one-hundred-and-twenty M13s. But
eighty-two tanks had just arrived at Benghazi and required ten days of "acclimatization"
prior to operation.
#
Following the fall of Tobruk, HQ British
Troops Egypt was removed from the existing unwieldy line of command so that
O'Connor reported directly to Wavell at Middle East Command. O'Connor continued
the advance towards Derna with the Australian 6th Division while sending 7th
Armoured Division south of the Jebel Akhdar Mountains towards Mechili. On 24
January the 4th Armoured Brigade engaged armoured elements of BCS on the Derna
- Mechili track. While the British managed to destroy nine Italian tanks in the
battle, they themselves lost one cruiser and six light tanks. The 2/11th
Battalion first made contact with infantry of the BCS at the Derna airfield on
25 January and progress was difficult against particularly determined resistance.
In the Derna-Giovanni Berta area, held by the 60th "Sabratha"
Infantry Division and infantry elements of the BCS, there were fierce exchanges
with Italian counterattacks taking place around Wadi Derna. On 27 January, an
Australian battalion beat off a strong daylight attack from a force of at least
a thousand Italians. That same day, concealed soldiers of the BCS ambushed a
column of armoured vehicles of the 6th Cavalry Regiment and took three of the
survivors prisoner. The advance of other units further to the south of the Wadi
Derna eventually threatened the BCS with encirclement and it disengaged on the
night of 28 January. Derna, a town of 10,000 residents itself was captured on
26 January. Precise casualty figures for the fighting for Derna and Giovanni
Berta have not been compiled but at least 15 Australians were killed fighting
the BCS and "Sabratha" Division. The Italians lost a good part of the
60th "Sabratha" Infantry Division in the fighting.
Italian
OOB at Derna January 1941
Italian defenders consisted of the 60th
Bersaglieri Motorcycle Battalion and the 21st Light Tank Battalion, both part
of the 60th Sabratha Division.
Raggruppamento
Maletti
The Maletti Group (Raggruppamento Maletti)
was an ad hoc "mechanized" unit formed by the Italian Royal Army
(Regio Esercito) in Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, or
ASI) during the initial stages of the Western Desert Campaign of World War II.
The group was formed in June 1940 and was destroyed in December of the same
year.
The Maletti Group was commanded by General
Pietro Maletti and was part of the Libyan Corps, also known as the "Royal
Corps of Libyan Colonial Troops" (Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali della
Libia). The group itself was composed of six battalions of Libyan infantry and
of two battalions of armor. The 2,500 Libyans were "mechanized" in
that they were transported in trucks. One armor battalion had thirty-five L3/33
and/or L3/35 tankettes. The other had thirty-five M11/39 medium tanks.[1]
During the very early stages of the North
African Campaign, the Maletti Group took part offensively in the Italian
invasion of Egypt and defensively during the British counterattack known as
Operation Compass. In September 1940, the group acted as a flank guard and led
the Italian advance from Libya into Egypt. By December, the group was in
defensive positions at the Nibiewa Camp near Sidi Barrani. Many of the armored
vehicles were "dug in" and acted as stationary pillboxes.
The Maletti group was considered the 3rd
Libyan Division in the initial Italian attack to Egypt, together with the 1st
Libyan Division Sibelle and the 2 Libyan Division Pescatori.
The Maletti Group was earmarked for early
destruction by the British. During the initial attack, Matilda infantry tanks
of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment exploited a hole in the Italian defensive
positions and attacked the Nibiewa camp from the rear. The Maletti Group was
destroyed and General Pietro Maletti was killed in action while trying to stop
the sudden attack:
The initial British assault would fall on
Nibeiwa Camp, where the only available Italian armoured unit was based, and it
achieved complete surprise. Raggruppamento Maletti, or Maletti Group, under
General Maletti, was an ad hoc formation consisting of 2,500 Libyan soldiers
and 2 Armoured Battalion, with thirty-five M11/39 medium tanks and thirty-five
L3/35 light tanks. It was earmarked for early destruction in the assault, which
commenced at 05:00hr with what appeared to be no more than another raid on the
eastern side of the camp. At 07:00, however, forty-eight Matilda tanks suddenly
appeared from the opposite side of the camp. They struck twenty-three unmanned
M11/39 tanks of the Maletti Group, which had been deployed to guard the unmined
entrance to the camp. The Italians were caught completely off guard and many
did not even reach their tanks, including General Maletti, who was killed
emerging from his dugout. They were slaughtered and their vehicles destroyed by
the British in less than ten minutes. The Italian artillery fought on valiantly,
firing on the Matildas and recording many hits, some at point-blank range - but
none penetrated their 70 mm of armour. The remaining Italian tanks were
captured intact, and the Libyan infantry, left practically defenceless, quickly
surrendered. The British had captured Nibeiwa and destroyed the only front-line
Italian armoured unit in less than five hours.
The Operation Compass attack on Maletti
Group was supported by 25 pounder artillery and Blenheim bombers and was
centred on the advance of Mk.II Matilda tanks. Within an hour of the onset of
combat Italian General Pietro Maletti was dead and 4,000 Italian soldiers (most
of them Libyan colonial troops) had surrendered. Within three days, the
attacking forces then moved west along the Via della Vittoria, through the
Halfaya Pass and captured Fort Capuzzo, Libya.
Brigata
Corazzata Speciale
The Special Armored Brigade (Brigata
Corazzata Speciale, or BCS, or Babini Group, or Raggruppamento Babini) was an
ad hoc armored unit formed by the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito Italia) in
Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, or ASI) during the
initial stages of the Western Desert Campaign of World War II. The group was
formed in late 1940 and was destroyed in February 1941.
In late 1940, the Italian Supreme Command
(Commando Supremo) moved quickly to organize the Brigata Corazzata Speciale
(BCS). In hardly more than a month, the Italians dispatched this volunteer
force to North Africa under the command of General Valentino Babini. The BCS
included Italy's most up-to-date medium tanks, the M13/40.
The M13s were a vast improvement over the
M11/39s used as part of the Maletti Group (Raggruppamento Maletti). As opposed
to the M11s, the M13s had a superior turret-mounted 47 mm tank gun. This gun
was more than able to pierce the armor of the British light and cruiser tanks.
The BCS included M13 tanks supported by
three Bersaglieri battalions, one motorcycle battalion, one artillery regiment,
two anti-tank gun companies, one engineering company, and several logistics
units. Unfortunately, other than command vehicles, the M13s of the BCS were not
equipped with radios. Communicating for most Italian tankers required the use
of signal flags.
At Derna and Mechili, the BCS included
fifty-five M13/40 tanks of the 3rd Battalion and the 5th Battalion from the
131st "Centauro" Armored Division. This should have amounted to at
least one-hundred-and-twenty M13s. But eighty-two tanks had just arrived at
Benghazi and required ten days of "acclimazation" prior to operation.
At Benghazi and Beda Fomm, the BCS included
almost one-hundred M13/40s.
