An armistice was signed at Réthondes on 22nd June. Hitler
and Germany basked in fame. So, too, did Guderian, for he suddenly found
himself renowned throughout the land, a hero whom the propagandists praised for
his contribution to the victory. Group Guderian was credited with 250,000
prisoners in 13 days' activity. Josef Goebbels and his agents uplifted Guderian
and had him broadcast to the nation. He told Gretel, 'How lovely that you heard
my speech. I really enjoyed making it'. There was an enormous fan-mail and
gigantic correspondence. 'The other day a former Gefreiter [lance
corporal] from the First World War sent me a harmonica from his factory. It's
fantastic how kind some people are'. As soon as the war was over he told his
propaganda officer, Paul Dierichs, to find films of the campaign and show them
to the troops. Later this material would be made into a documentary extolling
Guderian's command and the Panzerwaffe: never once did he forget to
publicise his organisation (and thus, be it said, himself) as counter to those
who still resented the triumph. But as Dierichs points out, Though he realised
the meaning of his success, it did not go to his head'.
There were more serious matters to contemplate, among them a
genuine hope that the fighting was over in the belief that Britain would give
up. That hope would soon die: the British fought on, but in any case neither
Guderian nor anybody else on the German side were aware that Hitler was
formulating schemes which outlawed peace.
Yet Guderian himself displayed the same conquering
restlessness as his Führer when, on 27th June, he shared his views with General
Ritter von Epp, who called in during a visit to the front. He explained to Gretel
that they discussed 'Colonial questions'. They did indeed, for Epp was an
expert on the subject: but the discussion also ranged over the course to take
if Britain went on fighting, and the manner of carrying the battle to the
remaining enemy. It is reflected on pages 136 and 137 of Panzer Leader and
is worth study as an indication of Guderian's contemporary attitude, as well as
a demonstration of his accurate reading of the strategic situation and the
shifting balance of power—at a time when the vanquished French were turning in
anger upon the British and the Italians had already entered the war on
Germany's side. He claimed, after the war, that 'in view of the insufficiency of
our preparations in the air and on the sea, which were far below what would be
needed to invade [England], other means would have to be found of so damaging
our enemy that he would accept a negotiated peace'.
He went on: 'It seemed to me, then, that we could ensure
peace in the near future by, first of all, advancing at once to the mouth of
the Rhône: then, having captured the French Mediterranean bases in conjunction
with the Italians, by landing in Africa, while the Luftwaffe's first-class
parachute troops seized Malta. Should the French be willing to participate in
these operations, so much the better. Should they refuse, then the war must be
carried on by the Italians and ourselves on our own, and carried on at once.
The weakness of the British in Egypt at that time was known to us. The Italians
still had strong forces in Abyssinia. The defences of Malta against air attack
were inadequate. Everything seemed to me to be in favour of further operations
along those lines, and I could see no disadvantages. The presence of four to
six panzer divisions in North Africa would have given us such overwhelming
superiority that any British reinforcements would inevitably have arrived too
late.'
Epp, of course, was a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi, one of the
original Freikorps' fighters who had won a reputation as the ruthless
exterminator of German Communists and who had helped finance the Nazi Party at
the outset. As a member of the Reichstag and Chief of the Nazi Party's
Department for Colonial Policy, Epp had the Führer's ear, even though he was
among those who doubted the wisdom of Germany's involvement in a major war.
Guderian claims that Epp put his scheme to Hitler but that Hitler was not
interested in exploring the possibilities further. This is not strictly correct. Hitler, inspired
not a little by Jodl, explored a multitude of projects after the fall of
France, among them collaboration with the Italians in an invasion of Egypt that
was firmly rebuffed by Mussolini who wanted to snatch a little glory for
himself in his own sphere of influence. He also made overtures to Spain in
connection with a drive to Gibraltar and, through the Armistice Commission, to
spread his political influence into French North Africa. Admiral Raeder, too,
put a strong naval case, linked with the U-boat offensive, for seizing
strategic points in Africa, including the West Coast. There are few now (and
maybe fewer then who were in the know) who would dispute the soundness of that
maritime strategy or its veritable certainty of success.
Hitler, however, was a land-animal who recognised the
allurements of the sea but left maritime adventures to sailors, preferring to
send his Army inland, exclusively in its natural environment engaged upon
operations which Hitler felt he understood best. Unknown to anybody else,
Hitler had never forgotten the project he always had in mind and fixed his
predatory gaze upon Soviet Russia.
By 22nd July both Brauchitsch and Halder were aware of their
Supreme Commander's intentions and had formulated an outline plan of campaign.
There would be nothing to spare for other projects, worthy though they might
seem. Instead the spectre of the two-front war, which Guderian and every sane
German feared above all, was being resurrected.
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