No 112 Sqn

Shark-mouthed Kittyhawks of 112SQN RAF. 

The squadron was re-formed 16 May 1939 on board the aircraft carrier HMS Argus for service in Egypt. It was based initially at RAF Helwan. On 26 May, "B" Flight was detached and sent to Sudan. The squadron did not receive its aircraft, obsolescent Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters, until June. After Italy  entered the war, on 10 June 1940, the squadron was almost immediately in action, defending Egypt from Italian bombers. "B" Flight became part of No. 14 Squadron RAF on 30 June.

In January 1941, the squadron joined Allied forces defending Greece, providing air cover and offensive support over Albania. It later took part in fierce dogfights as part of the air defence of the Athens area. With the collapse of the Allied campaign on the Greek mainland, 112 Sqn withdrew to Crete and then to Egypt, from where it rejoined the North African Campaign, supporting the Eighth Army.

For much of the remainder of the war, the squadron was part of No. 239 Wing, along with No. 3 Squadron RAAF, No. 250 Squadron RAF and/or No. 450 Squadron RAAF. For the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) on July 10, 1943, No. 239 Wing consisted of these four squadrons and No.260 Squadron as part of Air Vice Marshal Harry Broadhurst's Desert Air Force, an element of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham's Northwest African Tactical Air Force in the Northwest African Air Forces of Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, one of the major sub-commands of the Mediterranean Air Command under Air Commander-in-Chief Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder.

During July 1941, the squadron was one of the first in the world to become operational with the P-40 Tomahawk, which it used in both the fighter and ground attack role, with the Air Headquarters, Western Desert. Inspired by the unusually large air inlet on the P-40, the squadron began to emulate the "shark mouth" logo used on some German Messerschmitt Bf 110s of Zerstörer Geschwader 76 earlier in the war. This practice was later followed by P-40 units in other parts of the world (including the Flying Tigers, American volunteers serving with the Chinese Air Force). In December, the Tomahawks were replaced by the updated P-40 Kittyhawk, which the squadron used for the remainder of its time in North Africa, often as a fighter bomber.

The squadron during this time included a significant number of personnel from the air forces of Poland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Another member was the English ace Neville Duke (later prominent as a test pilot). For most of 1942, it was commanded by the highest-scoring Australian ace of World War II, Clive Caldwell, the first Empire Air Training Scheme graduate to command a British unit. He was succeeded by Billy Drake, the highest-scoring RAF P-40 pilot and the second-highest-scoring British Commonwealth P-40 pilot, behind Caldwell.

Later in the war, an increasing number of South African pilots joined the unit.

After the invasion of Sicily the squadron moved to bases there, in July 1943, and onto the Italian mainland in September. In June 1944 the Kittyhawks were replaced by the Mustang Mark III and, from February 1945, Mustang Mk IVs. The squadron remained in Italy as part of the occupying forces until disbanding on 30 December 1946 at Treviso.

By the end of the war some 206 air victories had been claimed by the Squadron, and 62 destroyed on the ground.

RAF-Army Cooperation in the Desert I

The general relationship between the army and air forces in the Western Desert remained relatively constant between 1939–43. The only air assets not under the direct control of the RAF were the Army Cooperation squadrons that provided corps headquarters with tactical reconnaissance and during operations could be sub-allotted under leading divisions.

While Army Cooperation squadrons “…act[ed] in close cooperation with corps H.Q. and [were] under army control” the commanding officer of the Advanced Wing advised the army commander on their employment. 33 The rest of the RAF operated independently. Yet in practice, both services had to cooperate closely, and operations by one often were planned to improve the position of the other. The course of land fighting often turned on air support, and success on the ground determined the placing of forward air bases.

Prior to the entry of Italy into the war, No.208 (Army Cooperation) and No.33 (Fighter) Squadrons were detailed to provide close support to the army. These aircraft initially were intended to be operationally controlled by 253 Wing, but just before Italy’s entry into the war it was disbanded and its equipment and personnel absorbed by 202 Group. Operational control of close support aircraft, exerted by “a small Air Liaison Section consisting of 1 Group Captain and 1 Squadron Leader” at headquarters Western Desert Force, was the first instance of a joint army/RAF headquarters. This method of control could not have withstood serious strain, but proved successful because of the limited operational front and “the absence of any administrative responsibility connected with the units.” This section commanded other bomber and fighter squadrons which were detailed for close support as required.

The general organization within the RAF in the Mediterranean area also changed early in the war. In the operational plans produced by HQ RAF Middle East in 1939, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RAF Middle East was to determine the strength allotted to each role of the RAF. In practice, because of the huge area of responsibility of RAF Middle East, “the actual operations and choice of targets [was] to be the responsibility of A.O.C. Egypt Group” (later No.202 Group). Similarly, the ancestor of the Western Desert Air Force, Air Headquarters Cyrenaica, was formed at Barce on 25 February 1941, renamed 204 Group on 12 April 1941, and on 9th October 1941 finally became Air Headquarters, Western Desert.

Opposing the RAF was the Regia Aeronautica, which had a considerable advantage in overall numbers, but failed to use them effectively. The figures for its numbers vary greatly, but the most accurate assessment shows that the Italians had 313 aircraft, of which roughly half were serviceable at any time, with another 1000 aircraft in Italy that could have been called upon to support operations, but were not. Against this, the RAF in the Middle East had 205 serviceable aircraft in June 1940.

When the Italians advanced on 13 September 1940, the British army offered little resistance, instead retreating to the prepared defences at Mersa Matruh. This location was chosen largely because it was the terminating point of the railroad, allowing the easy delivery of supplies. However, the defence was not intended to be a passive one. On 21 September General Wavell issued orders “for a counter-stroke to be prepared against the enemy, so soon as he became engaged with the defences of Matruh.”Reflecting typical RAF views, air support during the retreat to Matruh consisted largely of reconnaissance, “but also called for the bombing in conjunction with attacks by ground troops of enemy strong points threatening a safe withdrawal of British forces from the frontier.”

The Italian army, however, did not attack Matruh. Rather, it dug in near Sidi Barrani, eighty miles to the west, and showed no interest in further advance. Despite his serious numerical disadvantage, Wavell began to “consider the possibility of an early offensive action” to exploit the faulty defensive arrangements of the Italian army. Its defences consisted of a series of camps between Maktila and Sofafi, which were not mutually supporting and lacked depth.

In conjunction with Wilson and O’Connor, Wavell planned an early offensive code-named operation ‘Compass’. The plan called for the Support Group of the 7th Armoured Division to prevent the enemy forces in the camps around Sofafi from intervening in the battle, while the remainder of 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division passed through a gap between the Nibeiwa and Sofafi camps, cutting the Italian defences in two. A brigade “of the 4th Indian Division with the 7th battalion R.T.R. [Royal Tank Regiment] was then to attack Nibeiwa camp from the west, while the Armoured Division covered the attack and prevented any intervention from the enemy to the north.” After Nibeiwa camp was captured, the Tummar group of camps would be attacked from the west, again supported by armour.

The qualitative difference between forces, combined with the high degree of motorization of the British army, let the British run the operations according to plan. All objectives were taken quickly with little loss. Despite a fragile C3I structure, the British forces could complete the ‘OODA’ loop far faster than their Italian opponents. This success led to and was extended by the decision to press on Sidi Barrani. The 7th Armoured Division was employed to prevent the escape of forces at Sidi Barrani, which the 4th Indian Division attacked. The situation “at nightfall on 10 December was that Sidi Barrani had been captured and the 2nd Libyan and 4th Blackshirt Divisions destroyed.” The remaining enemy forces quickly withdrew to Bardia, but the initial campaigns had seen the destruction of five divisions, with 38,000 prisoners, over 400 guns and 50 tanks. British casualties were only 133 killed, 367 wounded and eight missing.

RAF-Army Cooperation in the Desert II

The attack on Bardia was delayed for sixteen days to allow supplies of ammunition to arrive from the railhead at Mersa Matruh. The plan called for the 6th Australian Division (which had replaced the 4th Indian Division) to attack west of Bardia, seizing a bridgehead and allowing engineers to fill in the anti-tank ditch circling the perimeter. Once this task was accomplished the tanks were to drive into the perimeter to the southeast and prevent the escape of the garrison, while the 6th Australian Division continued the assault. On 3 January 1941, the attack began. Like previous battles, it ended quickly with few British losses. By 1745 hours on 4 January, Italian forces in Bardia surrendered. The British netted 45,000 prisoners, 462 guns, 117 light, and 13 medium tanks.

These dramatic successes were due to the planning, secrecy, and execution of operation ‘Compass’, and the qualitative inferiority of Italian forces to the Western Desert Force and the RAF, yet the latter had problems of their own. Flawed C3I systems prevented the RAF and the army coordinating their efforts much beyond the planning stage against targets which were fixed and easily located, where the position of British troops was well known. Inefficiencies in command structures and communications, as well as a lack of suitable aircraft, crippled responses to calls for support. Weaknesses in the C3I systems of the RAF and army prevented the application of consistent air support, especially when forces were engaged in battle. Few aircraft were available to do so and tactics had not evolved to maximize the effect while minimizing losses. Despite this, RAF air support worked.

During the attacks on Sidi Barrani, Bardia, Tobruk, and Benghazi, RAF heavy bombers attacked military objectives by night, giving enemy troops no chance to rest. Medium bombers were “employed in a similar role to the heavy bombers both by day and night and at other times attacked enemy aerodromes.” Fighters were used to cover British troops, provide reconnaissance, and “make low flying attacks on mechanical transport on the enemy’s lines of communication.” Air support kept the pressure on a demoralized Italian army while heavy artillery was moved forward.

An aerial assault on Bardia preceded the ground attack. On the night of 1 January, Wellington and Bombay bombers dropped “over 20,000 lbs. of bombs on enemy defences and troop positions.” This attack was continued during the day by Blenheim medium bombers, followed by another night assault that dropped a further 30,000 pounds of bombs on Bardia. Over forty tons of bombs were dropped during these operations. Although accuracy often left much to be desired, this constant attack took an enormous toll on the thin veneer of Italian resistance. The overall effectiveness of RAF support was magnified by poor Italian morale. During the attack on Fort Capuzzo, for example, an RAF raid in which no bombs landed inside the target area induced the garrison to surrender. Some prisoners from the Sidi Barrani offensive reported that RAF bombing attacks “had caused great disorganization, mainly through its moral effect.” A senior Italian prisoner of war said that before the assault on Bardia the “RAF had harassed the defending units by day and night, robbing them of sleep and reducing their morale until when the assault came…they were reduced to a state of utter helplessness.”

However, the British C3I system showed problems that would prove costly against the Wehrmacht. Against an Italian army that could not react quickly to British attacks, these difficulties did not surface to any great degree, but still some British losses were suffered. During the battle for Sidi Barrani, 202 Group headquarters was situated alongside the advance headquarters BTE, 110 miles behind the battle area, while its aircraft were employed in bombing and strafing attacks. XIII Corps headquarters, which was really commanding operations, asked to control air action in the tactical area so to direct aircraft as accurately as possible. This request was refused. Confusion in the transmission of orders from XIII Corps through HQ BTE to No.202 Group resulted in an attack on friendly troops by RAF Hurricanes.

Providing tactical intelligence to pilots so to ensure they hit the target and not British troops proved as valuable as operational intelligence. To achieve this end, attacking aircraft could be directed to the target either from the ground or the air. In the latter case, they would rendezvous with reconnaissance aircraft, which led them to the target. This required excellent coordination between Army Air Support Control (AASC), the Air Officer Commanding Air Headquarters, Western Desert, and the RAF squadron involved. This coordination often failed. During ‘Compass’, the AASCs were ad hoc, consisting of one Australian and one New Zealand unit commanded by a British officer. Pilots had difficulty in identifying friendly and enemy forces. Once over the target, pilots looked for identification signals from those troops, and responded in turn. Several methods were attempted, but no complete solution to this difficult task ever was found. Indeed, even in the most recent conflicts, heavy casualties have been inflicted through ‘friendly fire’.

X FLIGHT

A Royal Air Force Special Duties flight based at Gambut, Egypt, X Flight was equipped with four Liberator bombers to fly clandestine missions from North Africa until March 1943, when it was reformed as 148 Squadron and provided with Halifaxes that flew into the Balkans. After the invasion of Italy, it was relocated to Brindisi, with a Lysander flight, and undertook long-range operations to Poland until late 1944, when it also covered northern Italy, Austria, and southern Germany. In June 1945, the unit was transferred to Foggia for transport duties, and it was disbanded in Egypt in January 1946.