The attack on Bardia was delayed for sixteen days to allow
supplies of ammunition to arrive from the railhead at Mersa Matruh. The plan
called for the 6th Australian Division (which had replaced the 4th Indian
Division) to attack west of Bardia, seizing a bridgehead and allowing engineers
to fill in the anti-tank ditch circling the perimeter. Once this task was
accomplished the tanks were to drive into the perimeter to the southeast and
prevent the escape of the garrison, while the 6th Australian Division continued
the assault. On 3 January 1941, the attack began. Like previous battles, it
ended quickly with few British losses. By 1745 hours on 4 January, Italian
forces in Bardia surrendered. The British netted 45,000 prisoners, 462 guns, 117
light, and 13 medium tanks.
These dramatic successes were due to the planning, secrecy,
and execution of operation ‘Compass’, and the qualitative inferiority of
Italian forces to the Western Desert Force and the RAF, yet the latter had
problems of their own. Flawed C3I systems prevented the RAF and the army
coordinating their efforts much beyond the planning stage against targets which
were fixed and easily located, where the position of British troops was well
known. Inefficiencies in command structures and communications, as well as a
lack of suitable aircraft, crippled responses to calls for support. Weaknesses
in the C3I systems of the RAF and army prevented the application of consistent
air support, especially when forces were engaged in battle. Few aircraft were
available to do so and tactics had not evolved to maximize the effect while
minimizing losses. Despite this, RAF air support worked.
During the attacks on Sidi Barrani, Bardia, Tobruk, and
Benghazi, RAF heavy bombers attacked military objectives by night, giving enemy
troops no chance to rest. Medium bombers were “employed in a similar role to
the heavy bombers both by day and night and at other times attacked enemy
aerodromes.” Fighters were used to cover British troops, provide
reconnaissance, and “make low flying attacks on mechanical transport on the enemy’s
lines of communication.” Air support kept the pressure on a demoralized Italian
army while heavy artillery was moved forward.
An aerial assault on Bardia preceded the ground attack. On
the night of 1 January, Wellington and Bombay bombers dropped “over 20,000 lbs.
of bombs on enemy defences and troop positions.” This attack was continued
during the day by Blenheim medium bombers, followed by another night assault
that dropped a further 30,000 pounds of bombs on Bardia. Over forty tons of
bombs were dropped during these operations. Although accuracy often left much
to be desired, this constant attack took an enormous toll on the thin veneer of
Italian resistance. The overall effectiveness of RAF support was magnified by
poor Italian morale. During the attack on Fort Capuzzo, for example, an RAF
raid in which no bombs landed inside the target area induced the garrison to
surrender. Some prisoners from the Sidi Barrani offensive reported that RAF
bombing attacks “had caused great disorganization, mainly through its moral
effect.” A senior Italian prisoner of war said that before the assault on
Bardia the “RAF had harassed the defending units by day and night, robbing them
of sleep and reducing their morale until when the assault came…they were
reduced to a state of utter helplessness.”
However, the British C3I system showed problems that would
prove costly against the Wehrmacht. Against an Italian army that could not
react quickly to British attacks, these difficulties did not surface to any
great degree, but still some British losses were suffered. During the battle
for Sidi Barrani, 202 Group headquarters was situated alongside the advance
headquarters BTE, 110 miles behind the battle area, while its aircraft were
employed in bombing and strafing attacks. XIII Corps headquarters, which was
really commanding operations, asked to control air action in the tactical area
so to direct aircraft as accurately as possible. This request was refused.
Confusion in the transmission of orders from XIII Corps through HQ BTE to
No.202 Group resulted in an attack on friendly troops by RAF Hurricanes.
Providing tactical intelligence to pilots so to ensure they
hit the target and not British troops proved as valuable as operational
intelligence. To achieve this end, attacking aircraft could be directed to the
target either from the ground or the air. In the latter case, they would
rendezvous with reconnaissance aircraft, which led them to the target. This
required excellent coordination between Army Air Support Control (AASC), the
Air Officer Commanding Air Headquarters, Western Desert, and the RAF squadron
involved. This coordination often failed. During ‘Compass’, the AASCs were ad
hoc, consisting of one Australian and one New Zealand unit commanded by a
British officer. Pilots had difficulty in identifying friendly and enemy
forces. Once over the target, pilots looked for identification signals from
those troops, and responded in turn. Several methods were attempted, but no
complete solution to this difficult task ever was found. Indeed, even in the
most recent conflicts, heavy casualties have been inflicted through ‘friendly
fire’.
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