The Anglo-American landings on the Algerian and Moroccan
coasts in November 1942 had upset the balance in the Mediterranean theater.
Hitler’s seizure of Tunisia provided the Axis a breathing space, but the
decision rested on no coherent operational or strategic analysis. The Germans
proceeded to rush large forces to consolidate their hold on Tunisia and
preserve their control of the mid-sea passage. Those forces were sufficient to
stop the Allied advance out of Algeria. As a result, the Axis powers poured nearly
a quarter of a million troops into the enclave. Again, no one in the German
military hierarchy stopped to consider how they might be supplied, given the
threat posed by British aircraft on Malta.
Moreover, instead of appointing an overall commander for the
North African theater, Hitler divided even the ground command. Rommel would
remain in command of the Afrika Korps, now retreating across Libya toward
Tunisia, but Generaloberst Jürgen von Arnim would command the divisions rushed
to Tunisia. Arnim was the worst sort of general staff officer—arrogant, hard to
work with, and contemptuous of those not wearing the claret stripe of the
general staff. Kesselring held overall command of German forces in the
Mediterranean. “Smiling Albert,” as he was nicknamed, provided considerable
charm and a Nazi ideological bent to his command. As the situation in North
Africa deteriorated, Kesselring issued an endless series of optimistic and
soothing reports to the OKW, while suggesting to his pilots that Japanese fanaticism
provided an excellent example of how they should conduct themselves. The great
German fighter pilot, Johannes Steinhoff, recalled attending a Kesselring
conference in March 1943: “Never in my life will I forget the Air Fleet
situation conference which I was permitted to attend. There was I, a combatant
officer, witnessing the prognostication and synthetic portrayal of the future
course of the battle in North Africa . . . I found the foppish affectation and
general superciliousness [of the staff officers] insufferable.”
While the Germans organized the defenses of Tunisia, the
British and Americans held a momentous conference at Casablanca. Starting on
January 14, in chill, damp villas, Roosevelt, Churchill, and their respective
military advisers conducted ten days of discussions on Allied strategy. The
Americans were still committed to the concept of a landing in Northwest Europe
in 1943; they had no interest in further operations in the Mediterranean after
the defeat of Axis forces in Tunisia. But the British had no intention of
supporting such a strategic approach, and with far superior staff work they won
nearly every major argument with the Americans. There would be no major landing
on the French coast in 1943, and Allied forces would invade Sicily in the
summer.
In retrospect, the British were entirely right. None of the
preconditions for a successful landing on the coast of France yet existed. The
Battle of the Atlantic was not over; the Luftwaffe had yet to be defeated; the
logistical infrastructure for the immediate support of the invasion did not
exist; and Allied air forces were not capable of interdicting the landing area
and preventing the Germans from moving rapidly against the invasion. About the
only argument the Americans won was a symbolic agreement to coordinate the
efforts of the Allied strategic bombing forces.
While the senior Allied staffs were arguing about strategy
at Casablanca, the Afrika Korps arrived in Tunisia. Rommel received only
minimal cooperation from Arnim. The field marshal proposed a major operation
with their combined panzer forces to strike at the supply dumps and air fields
the Allies had constructed in Algeria; the operation would take place before
the British Eighth Army had closed on Tunisia. Arnim, however, had no intention
of cooperating with Rommel, and so the attack occurred under two separate and
suspicious command structures. Nevertheless, the Germans achieved a
considerable local success. Major General Lloyd Fredendall, one of the few bad
appointments Marshall made in the war, commanded the American II Corps
defending the central Tunisian front. Quartered in a deep cave far from the
battlefield, Fredendall deployed his forces badly and then failed to provide
leadership in the crisis that occurred when Rommel attacked. The result was a
tactical setback at Kasserine Pass, one that should not have been entirely
unexpected, given how little time the Americans had had to train.
The Americans, however, proved fast learners, while
Fredendall’s replacement, George Patton, aroused the fighting spirit of U.S.
troops, even if at times he churned up more hatred for himself than for the
Germans. George Patton was one of the more bizarre characters produced by the
United States Military Academy and the United States Army. He was also a great
general. Field Marshal Douglas Haig, commander of British forces on the Western
Front in World War I, met Captain Patton in 1917 when he was aide to Pershing
and pronounced that Patton had big things in store for him. Badly wounded as
the commander of a tank unit in 1918, he returned to the dull, peacetime life
of the interwar U.S. Army, where he slowly rose in the officer corps. Warned
that his advocacy of the tank might put his career in jeopardy, Patton returned
to the cavalry. But behind Patton’s demeanor of the swash-buckling,
polo-playing cavalryman was a serious soldier who prepared himself
intellectually for the coming war. Independently wealthy, Patton was able to
accumulate an impressive library and travel extensively. Patton’s professional
weakness was his lack of a technical background that would have enabled him to
influence the inept decisions the army made in procuring tanks. His personal
weakness lay in an inability to control either his emotions or his mouth.
In the long run Kasserine Pass was of importance in setting
the U.S. Army on the path to becoming a truly effective military organization.
Unfortunately, many British senior officers failed to recognize that Kasserine
Pass represented the teething problems of a U.S. Army only beginning
rearmament. Thus, for the remainder of the war they would consistently
underestimate the increasingly impressive capabilities of U.S. ground forces.
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