Units that engage in the interception and exploitation of
the patterns and substance of an enemy’s low-grade signals traffic.
Intelligence gained through the Y-service is typically used in the
reconstruction of the enemy’s order of battle and movements; however, it also
provides important strategic intelligence. For example, on 20 May 1942 the
Royal Air Force Y-service in North Africa learned that the total amount of
enemy aviation fuel in the whole of Libya was only a paltry 3,283 tons.
This information enabled the RAF to gauge the effect of its
interdiction campaigns and helped to predict enemy combat capability. More important
to operations was the interception of enemy radio messages that contained
intelligence on the locations of enemy units, early warnings of enemy air
raids, as well as enemy tactics. This intelligence was intercepted,
interpreted, passed along to the group controller and to Headquarters Northwest
African Tactical Air Force, and aided in focusing Allied airpower against the
most profitable targets.
References Clayton,
Aileen. The Enemy is Listening. London: Hutchinson, 1980. Gladman, Brad.“Air
Power and Intelligence in the Western Desert Campaign, 1940–1943.” Intelligence
and National Security 13, 4 (Winter 1998). Public Record Office. AIR 40/2345
‘Y’ Daily Reports Middle East for 20 May 1942. Public Record Office. AIR
23/1710. Memorandum entitled Wireless Intelligence circulated by the Chief
Intelligence Officer,NWATAF, 13 May 1943. Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey.
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