The lessons learnt during Operation Crusader about fighting
methods and doctrine were eagerly studied, especially since they revealed that
much remained to be done in terms of training, with particular problems highlighted.
In January 1942 the BGS Eighth Army directed: 'Every opportunity will be taken
to carry out training ... so as to develop an established technique in this
type of operation, and to ensure that different units can carry it out in
combination even if they have not had an opportunity of training together
beforehand.' To assist in instruction a Training Branch at GHQ Middle East was
set up under Maj. Gen. John Harding, which set up and ran several training
establishments teaching the lessons of the Desert War. Middle East Command also
produced a series of Middle East Training Pamphlets to meet the demand for the
latest up-to-date information, although technically in-theatre publications
were forbidden by the War Office to prevent confusion and diversion from
official sources of information. Several desert training areas were developed
near lsmailia, Port Tewfik and the Pyramids for collective training by larger
formations, especially those new to the theatre of war.
The ability to train formations before being committed to
battle remained a luxury denied British High Command for most of 1941-12. Given
the high tempo of operations for much of the Desert War and constant demands
for fresh troops and equipment after heavy losses in battle, most new formations
were thrown into battle as soon as they deployed in North Africa. Pleas to give
them the three months collective training under desert conditions was simply
ignored. Much, therefore, still had to be learned the hard and costly way - in
battle. The inexperienced and poorly trained 1st Armoured Division was quickly
destroyed south-east of Agedabia, for example, when DAK struck back after
Crusader. The British High Command knew what was needed, but an opportunity to
effect real and meaningful changes and remedy the continuing training deficit
was largely denied them. The hurly burly of the Desert War simply robbed
British commanders at all levels of a sufficiently long quiet inactive period
for rest, reflection and training. While some meaningful instruction was
carried out by some motivated commanders of formations out of the line for rest
it was not enough. Indeed, not everyone was clear about what was happening and
how to correct battlefield mistakes. Logistical problems and shortages of
equipment hampered training efforts. Petrol shortages and fear of wear and tear
to vehicles was also a problem.
The Eighth Army Montgomery inherited in August 1942 had made
considerable progress in improving overall training standard, but was still in
need of work. Indeed, the new GOC quickly judged his troops as being 'somewhat
untrained' with the result that he scaled back his original plans for his
offensive as he feared he might be asking too much of them. Following the
Battle of Alam Haifa Montgomery had an opportunity denied previous commanders
of Eighth Army to carry out a period of rigorous training needed to prepare for
the offensive that drove the Axis out of Egypt and Libya. In some respects the
scope of training required was more limited given the breakthrough battle
planned. As a result, with only a short time before battle began, he insisted
it focused on the type of battle that lay ahead at EI Alamein. To do so the
armoured divisions and New Zealand Division in 10th Corps were withdrawn behind
the lines, but the remainder were tied down in the forward defences at EI
Alamein. To give them some instruction, a complex system of reliefs was
arranged a brigade at a time. The importance of combined-arms training was
clearly recognized by the new GOC. In an Army Training memorandum issued on 30
August 1942 he directed: 'It cannot be emphasised too strongly that successful
battle operations depend on the intimate co-operation of all arms, whether in
armoured or unarmoured formations. Tanks alone are never the answer; no one
arm, alone and unaided can do any good in battle.' Great attention was paid to
passing through minefields at night. An Eighth Army Minefield Clearance School
was formed to study and train for this specialized task.
The careful training carried out before Second EI Alamein
built enormous confidence and in turn reaped enormous dividends throughout the
remainder of the Desert War. Training remained an ongoing process as new
lessons were learnt. By the end of the war in North Africa Eighth Army had
achieved a new confidence, professionalism and skill it had never possessed
before, which stood it in good stead for the invasion of Sicily and the Italian
campaign.
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