Officers of the 11th
Hussars use a parasol to give shade during a halt, while out patrolling on the
Libyan frontier, 26 July 1940. The vehicle is a Morris CS9 armoured car.
In Egypt the declaration of war found the armoured cars of
the 11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) tinder Lieutenant-Colonel John Combe
lying close by the frontier. With instructions to raise hell, they immediately
crossed the fence of barbed wire built by Italian engineers along the 400-mile
(644km) border. In a series of dashing hit-and-run raids, they attacked forts
and shot up transport columns, capturing bewildered soldiers whom nobody had
bothered to inform about Mussolini's declaration. By dawn on 12 June, all their
patrols had returned, bringing with them 70 prisoners and having suffered no
casualties. More importantly, they had established a moral superiority over the
Italians.
Encouraged by this start, plans were made to assault Forts
Maddalena and Capuzzo; the attacks were launched on 14 June. Joined by elements
of 4th Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier J. R. L. 'Blood' Caunter (named
after his favourite exhortation 'Buckets of Blood!') and 1st Battalion, King's
Royal Rifle Corps, Fort Maddalena fell without a shot being fired, having
already been abandoned by all but 18 of the garrison. Fort Capuzzo offered some
small resistance, but its 226 men also surrendered without bloodshed. Of some
significance was the result of an encounter with six Italian Fiat-Ansaldo LS
Tankettes. These were engaged with a Boyes anti-tank rifle, which knocked one
out immediately while the others ran 'like a lot of little pigs'.
Two days later, two troops of 11 H were 'swanning around'
between Sidi Omar and Fort Capuzzo when one troop encountered an Italian column
of 12 L3s and 30 lorries, apparently on their way to re-garrison the fort. At
almost the same time, the second troop reported another column of 17 L3s and 40
lorries heading to meet the first. Although the squadron commander ordered them
to withdraw, the two troops had eagerly charged forward to engage the enemy.
During a brisk skirmish, they managed to knock out three of the L3s before
retiring behind a slight rise when the column produced a field gun. Combe
quickly gathered all the available reserves, including a mixed squadron of
Light and Cruiser tanks from 7th Queen's Own Hussars, and an anti-tank troop of
the Royal Horse Artillery from 4 Armd Bde, and rushed to join the action. When
he arrived at the rise, he was staggered to see the column (the second one
never appeared) some three miles away on a completely open plain, formed up in
square as if fighting colonial tribesmen.
Unsure if the Italians had more artillery, Combe sent
forward some of the tanks who were fired at by the single grin and charged by
the L3s. These were knocked out with one shot each, whereupon the tank circled
the square in Red Indian fashion, shooting up the unprotected infantry and
lorries. They made two complete circuits before the Italians revealed hidden
guns at each corner. After a bitter but intense firefight in which the gallant
gun detachments were shot down to a man, the square broke, only to be promptly
rounded up. Barely 100 men and a dozen lorries were left to make the sad
.journey into captivity. Thus ended the 'Battle' of Nezuet Ghirba. Among the dead
was Colonello D'Avanso whose pocket yielded his orders. They were to 'destroy
enemy elements which have infiltrated across the frontier, and give the British
the impression of our decision, ability and will to resist'.
The free-wheeling continued until the end of July, by which
time the Italians were deploying heavy all-arms columns supported from the air.
Steadily, their strength was increasing, including support from a few MI 1/39
tanks and invariably from their efficient and brave artillery. At sea, the
Royal Navy shelled a flotilla of minesweepers in Tobruk harbour, an action
admired by an 11 H patrol on the beach, only 100 miles (161 km) behind enemy
lines! Apart from continuous anti-submarine operations, the RN encountered no
surface opposition and bombarded Bardia on 21 June. The Italians retaliated
with night air-raids on Alexandria and Aboukir. A week later they attacked
Royal Air Force bases at Sidi Barrani and Mersa Matruh, whose Gladiator
fighters matched the opposing Fiats. But they failed to launch an effective air
campaign, either against the RAF or against vulnerable Allied shipping.
Desert conditions impose considerable wear and tear on
equipment, especially on vehicles, and in mid-August, 4 Armd Bde was withdrawn
and replaced by 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Armoured Division's Support Group
under Brigadier M: H. E. 'Strafer' Gott. His orders were to maintain
observation and impose delay with his two infantry battalions, artillery
regiment and supporting elements. 11 H were ordered to reduce their activities
and rest half their number. Neither side had made any territorial acquisitions
but the opportunity had been there for the testing of equipment, techniques
and, most importantly, of men. Both sides suffered from technical deficiencies but
where the Italians had the benefit of superior numbers, the British undoubtedly
held a professional and moral advantage. The first three months of the campaign
saw the British inflict 3,500 casualties upon the Italians for the loss of just
150.
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